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Abstract 
The British referendum result to opt for exiting the European Union (EU) has left both the United 
Kingdom (UK), as well as the rest of the EU with questions regarding the future of the integration and 
their future economic development. While the EU member-states present a united front in regards to 
the leave process, there are deeply rooted divisions on all other relevant policy questions. The issues of 
migration, foreign policy, and the level of cohesion within the EU itself represent the questions where 
there is little or no consensus. The paper concludes that both the UK and the EU need to address a deep 
political divide and find a way to coexist in the aftermath of Brexit. 
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Introduction  
Brexit was an event that shocked the political elite of the United Kingdom (UK), the 
leaders of the European Union (EU) and the EU bureaucracy. It shocked the Britons 
as well, no matter what option they supported – Remain or Leave. It also surprised, 
shocked, and/or scared many Europeans. It led to the immediate resignation of Prime 
Minister David Cameron, who firmly supported the Remain option, despite the fact 
that his government initiated the referendum. On the other hand, it led to the 
resignation of one of the most vigorous supporters of the Leave option, the UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage. With the implementation of Brexit, it would seem that UKIP has 
concluded its mission. It is currently struggling to find a niche where it might appeal 
to voters.  
In the wake of the Brexit referendum both the EU and the UK face serious questions 
about the future. While the EU member-states present a united front in the leave 
process, there are deeply rooted divisions among them on other relevant policy 
questions. The issues of migration, foreign policy, and the level of cohesion within the 
EU itself are all questions where there is little or no consensus. The paper explores the 
factors that caused Brexit, the immediate economic implications for the UK, and the 
particular social implications for the EU. The UK strongly relies on exports as a source 
of revenue and generator of economic growth. It is therefore difficult to understand 





leave the UK without the same level of access to the open market. On the other hand, 
migration inflow—an issue that is constantly at the forefront of the Brexit debate, 
seems to have a neutral or slightly positive impact on economic growth, as shown in 
our model later in this paper. 
In explaining Brexit and why it occurred, we start with a detailed theoretical 
discussion. We review the national preference formation part of A. Moravcsik’s (1993: 
473-524) framework, as used in Jensen and Snaith (2016: 1302-1310). We proceed 
with the use of Prospect theory, which explains Brexit (and the Trump phenomenon as 
well) in terms of the groups of voters, so-called ‘globalization losers’ that have almost 
nothing to lose. These voters are therefore willing to take a risk for anti-establishment 
and untested political options. Then we turn to the factors that caused Brexit, the 
implications of Brexit for the EU, and public opinion in the EU member states. Finally, 
we address the immediate economic consequences of Brexit. 
Explaining Brexit: National Preference Formation theory and 
Prospect theory 
We believe three main developments, two long-term and one more recent, can be seen 
as the main factors that caused Brexit: 
• the influx of EU and non-EU originated immigration into the UK, which has 
been ongoing for decades, but has increased rapidly since 2004; 
• the neoliberalisation of British society, initiated under Thatcherism and 
impacting negatively on the accomplishments of Keynesian-style capitalism 
(the ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism) for more than three decades, including on the 
UK’s manufacturing; 
• the false and unrealisable promises of the Leave campaign that can be traced 
back to the period after (then) British Prime Minister Cameron in 2013 
promised1 the referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU, to be held after 
the general elections in 2015. This factor is a product of the first two factors, 
combined with a risky political game played by former Prime Minister David 
Cameron. He believed that he would be able to control the level of resentment 
towards the EU and concurrently return the position of the Conservative Party, 
to that of the defender of the UK and national interests from the EU. Even at 
that time, his position had already been seriously questioned and jeopardized 
by the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). 
 
Each of the three afore-mentioned factors of Brexit will be further discussed in the 
following sections of this paper, before turning to the political and social consequences 
of Brexit that have already begun to impact not just on the UK, but on the EU as well. 
The national preference formation part of Moravcsik’s model for studying European 
integration (besides interstate bargaining, and choice of international institutions) 
																																																								
1 The first occasion the UK's membership was put into question by the then leader of the opposition David 
Cameron was after the Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified by all member states, in November 2009. The 
Conservative Party and Mr Cameron led a campaign for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. 
See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/6502361/EU-Lisbon-Treaty-David-Cameron-
promises-vote-on-future-EU-changes.html (accessed May 20, 2017). 
Then, in 2013, this time as Prime Minister, Mr Cameron promised a referendum on the membership of the UK in 
the EU: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282 (accessed May 20, 2017). 
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focuses on the process by which states form their objectives. It emphasizes the primacy 
of geopolitical factors and structures in the formation of national preferences. In the 
second theory of national preference formation, Moravcsik differentiates ‘political 
economic’ from ‘economic’ through the category of nation. While economic theories 
focus only on the consequences of policy for overall market efficiency, political 
economic theories take into account efficiency and distributional concerns, 
respectively. The relative strength of interest groups within a state is analysed, hence 
it determines how national preferences will be formed (see Moravcsik, 1993: 473-524). 
Writing before Brexit actually occurred, Jensen and Snaith (2016: 1303) address three 
main elements of Moravcsik’s framework, of which the second and the third2 element 
are of particular interest to us (Jensen and Snaith’s premises are shown in regular 
typeface; comments and explanations of the author of this paper are in italics): 
• Regarding the first element applied to Brexit and the UK: Gathering enough 
evidence that the membership in the EU benefits certain sectors of the UK 
economy (for example, agriculture i.e. farmers). 
It has been argued that the media and public figures ignored important 
financial assessments and other quantifiable data regarding the UK’s benefit 
from EU membership in arguing for ‘Britain to go it alone’ 3 . This was a 
campaign of unrealistic and unrealisable promises as well as bombastic 
announcements, with most of the grievance projected towards the EU. The key 
question was not supposed to be whether the UK was benefitting from its 
membership in the EU, but who in Britain was really ‘benefitting’ and how 
much, and who was ‘losing’, and how much. The Remain campaign was not so 
cohesive. Mr. Cameron and Mr. Corbyn, who were supposed to be the main 
political opponents, both campaigned for the Remain option. The supporters 
of the Remain option were also overwhelmed by the power and persuasiveness 
of the Leave campaign supporters, which in the end turned out to be decisive. 
• The second element applied to Brexit by Jensen and Snaith is: In the context of 
a potential Brexit, we should observe a change of interests or incentives – such 
as the decrease in economic interdependence – that would render it more 
favourable for the UK to go it alone. 
We believe that a referendum on the UK membership, promised and organised 
by the UK government can be perceived as an expression of the tendency 
towards less interdependence and therefore less internationalisation. It is a 
negative reaction towards too much interdependence due to the UK’s 
membership in the EU, although the possibility that the UK would ever join the 
EMU was nothing more than a fantasy. 
• Moravcsik’s third element, applied to Brexit by Jensen and Snaith, suggests that 
as the distributional consequences of policy co-ordination vary, opposition is to 
																																																								
2 The first element is based on a liberal understanding of state–society relations, according to which societal 
‘groups articulate preferences and governments aggregate them’ (Moravcsik 1993: 482). 
The second element predicts that vulnerability to externalities owing to economic interdependence creates 
incentives for governments to co-ordinate policies internationally (ibid: 485-486). 
The third element suggests that as the distributional consequences of policy co-ordination vary, opposition is to be 
expected from those who are disadvantaged (ibid: 486-487). 
3 ‘Brexit would damage Britain’s economic growth prospects over the period 2016-2020. Exactly 68% of 
respondents thought that Brexit would increase the risk of a serious negative shock in British economy 





be expected from those who are disadvantaged This line of argumentation needs 
to be recalibrated, since the reference point is not future but rather existing 
international policy co-ordination, entailing that there must be either a change 
in the power equilibrium of domestic groups in favour or changes in their 
preferences. 
This argument fits into the explanation that those who felt most disadvantaged 
(due to the neoliberalisation of British society, immigration that lowered the 
price of labour, the demise of UK manufacturing, and turning the City into the 
motor of the economy, with the majority of the benefits going to very few 
people) were the ones who made Brexit happen. The differences in socio-
economic status, age, and regional affiliations of the Leave and the Remain 
campaign supporters, offer us a picture of the Britain of haves and the Britain 
of have-nots. 
The second theoretical framework that we address here is Prospect theory. This 
theoretical approach explains Brexit (and the Trump phenomenon as well) in terms of 
the groups of voters, so-called ‘globalization losers’ that have almost nothing to lose—
and who are therefore willing to take a risk. Prospect theory explains when and why 
people are willing to take risks. The key aspect it can explain is why so many people 
voted for Brexit (and Trump) despite knowing how much uncertainty the outcome of 
their vote, if successful, would bring. By giving examples from the game of roulette, 
Heintz (2016) explains in what situations Prospect theory identifies people as risk 
seeking or risk averse and points out that in situations when people have little to lose, 
they are more willing to take risks. Brexit and Trump campaigns have been focused 
more on the losses than on gains, and their key messages ‘Taking back control’ and 
‘Make America great again’, respectively, as Heintz emphasized, have referred to the 
lost grandeur of the past. Brexit and Trump voters are mostly those people who feel 
they have lost something, and are willing to take risks to try to overcome their 
economic frustrations. 
The Factors that Caused Brexit #1: Immigration to the United 
Kingdom 
Among the factors that influenced the decision of the majority of UK voters, Sinn 
(2016: 42) points out immigration from other EU countries, fears of an obligation to 
‘save’ Southern Europe, and a sense that the UK’s citizens have become alienated from 
its political class because of the supranational aspects that come with being part of the 
EU.  
Gietel-Basten (2016: 674) pointed out that in the second half of the 2000s, net 
migration to the UK fluctuated between three and four hundred thousand per year, 
reaching a peak just before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis (ONS, 2016). Britain 
had been one of only a few EU member states not to impose any restrictions on free 
movement following 2004, the year of the largest ever EU enlargement (see Vargas-
Silva, 2016: 251-255). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether immigration was the 
most important factor. The areas where immigrants have settled mostly did not show 
high level of support for the UKIP4. 
																																																								
4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/11539388/Mapped-where-is-Ukips-support-strongest-Where-
there-are-no-immigrants.html (accessed May 20, 2017).  
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The analysis of migration as a driving force for Brexit requires a quantitative analysis 
which would study the effects of migration on the UK’s economy. A regressive model 
is included that gradually increases the number of variables, with observations for 
annual data for the period 1975-2012. This serves two purposes – increasing the 
predictability value of the model, and, as net migration will serve as one of the ‘basic’ 
variables, it is possible to determine whether or not the impact of net migration on 
economic growth at some stage became negative for the economy of the UK. To clarify, 
this regressive model is based on a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, 
where the impact of a series of variables, such as inflation (CPI index), life expectancy, 
export revenue, tax revenue, net migration, and the interest rate on the economic 
growth were measured through the value of the UK’s GDP. 
Log transformations are required for the following variables: export revenue, tax 
revenue, net migration, as well as GDP, in order to avoid errors concerning 
heteroscedasticity. Data concerning net migration was extracted from Migration 
Watch (2017), while the remaining variables were extracted from the UK Office for 
National Statistics (2017). In order to avoid errors concerning ‘spurious’ or statistically 
insignificant regression models, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was used to 
determine whether the variables are stationary. If the variable was not stationary, the 
difference of the variable was calculated and the variable was used in the difference in 
which we find that variable is stationary. The number of lags used was automatically 
determined based on the Akaike information criterion. The summary of the test 
results, as well as the information on the transformations on the variables is presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test  
Variable Conclusion Transformation 
performed 
Export I(1) Log difference 
Life exp I(1) First difference 
Interest rate I(0) In original form 
CPI I(0) In original form 
Tax revenue I(1) Log difference 
GDP I(1) Log difference 
Net migration I(0) Log transformation 
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output 
In order to estimate the regression model, we will start with a basic model that 
estimates the impact of exports and migration on GDP, while including a constant and 
error term. The regression will then further include the additional variables, as 
presented in Table 1. The results of the regression coefficients are presented in Table 
2. 
Table 2: The summary of regression models used 
 F-statistic R-
squared 








































































Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output 
Note: values in the parenthesis represent the p value, while * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels of statistical significance respectively.   
These regressive models have proven several aspects of what was encompassed in the 
theoretical discussion i.e. qualitative analysis of this paper. Migration inflow, an issue 
constantly at the forefront of the Brexit debate, seems to have a neutral or slightly 
positive impact on the UK’s economic growth; hence there are no negative values of 
correlation in the Migration column. It is not possible to determine any evidence of a 
negative impact of the increase of migration on economic growth. 
The Factors that Caused Brexit #2 & #3: The Neoliberalisation of 
British Society and the Promises of the Leave Campaign 
The continuing, persistent neoliberalisation of British society, whose beginnings can 
be traced to the Thatcher era, has had a strong impact on the society of the UK. 
Especially in England, society became more divided, by age, education, regional 
affiliation, and sectors of economic activity. The Labour governments of Prime 
Ministers T. Blair and G. Brown kept most of the Thatcher era policies. The impact of 
these policies has found its reflection in many aspects of social life, such as attempts to 
control labour beyond the work place by attacking the position of trade unions 
combined with aspects of social conservatism attacking the gains made by minority 
groups such as women, gay and ethnic groups in the 1960s and 1970s (Harvey, 2005). 
The results of the divisions in British society are reflected in the results of the vote on 
Brexit, by regional affiliation, age, education, and the background of the voters. The 
groups that supported Brexit the most were elderly, blue-collar working or retired 
people, mostly living in Northern and Central England, and completely untouched 
(except in a negative context) by the financialisation and globalisation of Southern 
England – London and the City5 in particular. 
Desai and Freeman (2016: 15) have noted that Britain’s Gini coefficient, the measure 
of its inequality, has risen from about 0.26 in 1979 to over 0.4 today. The authors have 
pointed out that neoliberalism has divided Britain geographically, into a prosperous 
London and South East, an especially depressed North with its deindustrialised run-
																																																								
5 The very differing experiences of London and its hinterland from the rest of the UK are a result of the fact that 
the London economy has responded to modern globalisation since the late 1980s in a totally different manner 
than other parts of the UK (Los et al., 2017: 5). 
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down cities, and a mildly more social democratic Scotland able to avoid some of the 
worst of the social breakdown visited upon the north of England, with the rest of the 
country performing indifferently. 
Clarke and Newman (2017: 107) have identified three groups that have been offered to 
the British voters by the Leave campaign as responsible for the present situation. These 
groups are: the metropolitan–cosmopolitan liberal elite (out of touch Europhiles, the 
architects of political correctness, insulated by wealth and social position from the 
effects of Europeanisation); the European elite (i.e. German Chancellor Merkel and the 
EU bureaucrats), and the migrants, enabled by Europe’s free movement rules and 
consuming scarce resources, with the claim (only partially correct) that the UK’s 
membership in the EU is the main factor that lures the migrants to the UK (Clarke and 
Neman, 2017). 
Looking at Brexit from an Australian perspective, Quiggin (2016: 567-568) argues that 
it has been a major failure of the left in not articulating a viable alternative to 
neoliberalism. He explains that the conventional wisdom has been that a weakening of 
globalisation would undermine Australian living standards. However, major issues 
remain, as Quiggin points out – reducing inequality, but without resorting to 
protectionism. 
The dictatorship of neoliberal capitalism and the ‘TINA’ (There Is No Alternative)6 
doctrine, continues, despite the Great Recession (actually the recession activated the 
Keynesianism mechanisms of saving the irresponsible, often predatory private capital, 
concentrated in the financial sector, and therefore endorsed further neoliberalisation 
of capitalist economies). In that sense, Brexit can be perceived as a reaction of ‘the 
globalisation/neoliberalisation losers’. 
The (false) promises that the exit from the EU will allow Britain to take back full control 
over its destiny, to restrict migration, to disregard Brussels bureaucrats and to regain 
its colonial time influence were among the biggest promises of the Leave campaign7. 
The protection of the NHS system of health security8 and the promise that 350 million 
pounds per week would be injected into the NHS instead of sending them to ‘Brussels’ 
was probably the promise that was decisive among the middle-aged and elderly, blue-
collar population of Northern and Central England, whose pro-Brexit stance in the end 
prevailed. Such a claim was even disavowed by Prime Minister, Theresa May, although 
she never promised it, and therefore is not responsible. On the other hand, Boris 
Johnson, who was part of the Leave campaign, and was making such promises is one 
of the key members of the both UK governments determined to extract the UK from 
the EU through means of a ‘hard Brexit’9. The fact that both May governments consist 
																																																								
6 A phrase/doctrine of neoliberal proponents of the omnipresent globalization, first used in the 1980s by M. 
Thatcher, and used again by D. Cameron: ‘If there was another way I would take it. But there is no alternative.’ 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21703018; http://www.pandopopulus.com/tina-there-is-no-alternative/ 
(accessed May 20, 2017). 
7 ‘Many protest voters have made it clear that they are protesting the failure of the ‘establishment’ to address the 
problems of workers and communities left behind by a shift out of primary and secondary industries and by 
automation—in effect by globalisation. It is not clear how decoupling from the EU will make that better (Watts, 
2017: 102).’ 
8 ‘Brexit was about gut-wrenching issues like borders, culture, and the homeland. Remarkable to many outsiders, 
the NHS is almost a religion in the UK; its ‘overstretching’—especially by foreigners—presented as a blasphemy 
(Gietel-Basten, 2016: 678).’ 






of Brexiteers and Remain supporters points to the lack of credibility of the 
government(s) to pursue a ‘hard Brexit’, with the modifying stance of the Labour party, 
significantly more represented in the Parliament after the recent general elections on 
8 June 2017, not quite supporting the proclaimed goal: ‘Brexit means Brexit’. 
Discussing the issues that were used in pro and contra Brexit campaign(s), Das (2016: 
18) pointed out that the debate was always between economics and sovereignty (in the 
guise of immigration and border control), with exaggerated claims of economic losses, 
based on macro-economic models, which have failed to engender fear, rejected. 
Sovereignty, no matter how it was imagined and presented, prevailed. Additionally – 
what seems to be a backfire syndrome and the confirmation of Prospect theory, some 
of the UK regions reliant on exports to the EU voted strongly to leave that same EU. 
The groups in the British society who felt left behind by globalisation, financialisation, 
the City, and Brussels, were the ones that made ‘their voice heard’, their expectations 
fuelled by the promises of ‘taking back control’. Something similar happened in 
November 2016 in the U.S.A., with the election of Trump for president. The key for 
winning the support in the ‘battleground states’ was speaking as the voice of the same 
forgotten, blue-collar workers, whose position in the society was declining. 
The Implications of Brexit on the EU and the Public Opinion in the 
EU Member States 
Brexit is turning out to be a rising problem for the UK. The growth of the problem is 
incremental, as the day of a planned ‘divorce’ with the EU approaches, and initial 
positions still have not been assumed. The position of the old-new government in 
Westminster reflects the unrealistic promises made during the campaign that it is 
possible to leave the EU, without bearing the additional costs and being able to keep 
maximum benefits, and not bear the responsibilities and the burden of payment in case 
the UK wants to remain a part of the EU’s single market. It seems that Westminster 
wants to pick what it wants from the EU, and what it does not, similar to the way the 
UK has always behaved in its relations with Europe and the EU – always keeping its 
special relations with the U.S.A. and its special position towards the ‘Continent’. Two 
French vetoes before the UK actually was able to join the (then) European Community 
(EC), a referendum on the UK membership in the EC only two years after its accession 
(held in 1975), the UK’s decision not to even consider accepting the Euro, are some 
indicators of the UK position. The UK’s negotiating position on the terms of Brexit 
grows weaker with the passage of time, and the new government is weaker than the 
old. It has lost the support of the Labour party for its Brexit plans, which the first May 
government initially had. 
There is a  view, shared by Dennison et al. (2016: 4), that the UK will still be one of the 
most important states in the world – fifth largest economy, one of the most powerful 
NATO member states, and the leader of the Commonwealth, championing free trade, 
now unburdened by unnecessary EU rules and regulations. However, the authors also 
emphasised that Brexiteers failed to point to any foreign policy areas where Britain has 
actually been held back by the EU. De Grauwe (2016: 250) warned that the choice for 
the UK will be difficult. Either the UK government will embrace (a close version of) the 
Norwegian model or it will need to stand alone and negotiate new trade agreements 
with the EU and about 50 other countries (or group of countries) within the framework 
of the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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As every issue has two sides – while Brexit represents a major issue for the UK, it also 
poses one of the key issues for the EU as a whole, its functioning and unity. Brexit can 
be interpreted as the most important sign from the demos in one of the (still) EU 
member states that the EU as such needs a thorough overhaul. Otherwise, the EU faces 
the danger of becoming (even) more dysfunctional, with rancour felt by significant 
parts of the demos in the increasing number of its member state sat a time of terrorist 
attacks, rising xenophobia, continuous non-EU irregular migrant influx, with the 
member states sharing the burden ever more disproportionately, not to mention an 
aggressive Russia and an aggrieved Turkey, with imperial visions of their strong 
leaders, respectively. 
Brexit also adversely affects the EU in economic, political, social and financial aspects. 
The effects of Brexit include decreasing political and military power of the EU (the UK 
spent USD 57 billion, i.e. 2.4% GDP on military purposes in 2013); reduction of 
demographic potential of the EU (by 65 million, i.e. 12.8%); reducing economic 
potential of the EU (reduction of GDP by 17.5%, reduction of merchandise exports by 
23% and reduction of commercial services exports by almost 38%); reducing the EU 
budget (as a result of Brexit the EU will lose an important net contributor: in 2015 the 
UK paid GBP 13 billion to the EU budget and received GBP 4.5 billion (Pawlas, 2017: 
69-70). 
Sutherland (2016: 312) pointed out that the chaos after the Brexit vote has had one 
positive effect, namely increased support for the EU in the remaining EU27, and only 
may prove to be less in (post-communist, authors’ remark) Central and Eastern 
Europe, where politics is showing a strong nationalist tendency. 
Poli (2016: 4) noted that in Germany and Belgium the citizens mostly did not 
understand why the Britons chose to opt-out of the EU. The Italians and French 
appeared to be more sympathetic towards the British decision to leave the EU. This 
might certainly be explained by anti-EU sentiments registered in those countries over 
the previous few years10.’ 
	  
																																																								
10 The pattern seems clear – the citizens of the countries that have more economic problems and feel that the 





The Immediate Economic Implications of Brexit on the UK 
Before the referendum on Brexit took place, various prognoses assessed the possible 
negative impacts on the UK economy. Marshall (2016: 455) stated that after Brexit, the 
UK’s economic power has dropped immediately, with France overtaking the UK and 
becoming the fourth largest economy of the world (and the second largest economy of 
the EU). Marshall also warned about the vulnerability of the UK’s economy, 
emphasising the negative balance of payments in the last 30 years, rising deficit (as % 
of GDP), and a short term (which actually turns out to look like mid-term) sharp 
decrease of the sterling exchange rate. Sinn (2016: 43) emphasized the post-Brexit 
problems for the financial sector, emphasising that the joint British-German stock 
exchange will hardly be able to set up its main headquarters in London now, and 
estimating, probably too pessimistically, that London real-estate prices will fall, and 
financial institutes will go bankrupt. Desai and Freeman (2016: 13) emphasised the 
negative financial consequences of Brexit; hence it may have caused stock markets to 
take their deepest plunge ever, sending the pound sterling down to a 31-year low.  
Predicting the outcomes of Brexit regarding financial matters, Mendez-Parra et al.11 
have predicted Brexit could cause a 10% devaluation of the pound, and a possible 
reduction in UK’s GDP of 3%, as well as decline in British exports to developing 
countries. Additionally, Beck (2016: 26) warned about the importance of the FDI and 
the connections between the UK and the EU, pointing out that almost half of FDI in 
the UK comes from other EU countries, which suggests that EU membership is not the 
only driver of foreign investment in the UK. However, these deepening and 
increasingly complex relationships arereflected by the fact that half of the UK’s inward 
stocks of foreign investment and also half the UK’s outward foreign investment stocks 
are with the EU, which is shown in the data provided by Allen and Dar (2013: 4). 
Less than a year after Brexit, there are five signs that it is hurting the UK economy: 
inflation is on the rise, GDP growth is decreasing, immigration is slowing down, house 
prices are slumping, and mortgage lending is falling12. 
Conclusion 
Brexit was an unexpected, abrupt event, in which certain groups in UK society, as well 
as certain regions, overwhelmingly voted for leaving the EU, thereby critically 
influencing the outcome. Neither the majority of the UK political elite nor the political 
elites of the EU member states wanted Brexit to happen. However, when it happened, 
after the initial shock, a sense of relief and acceptance of the new reality has spread. 
Brexit has shown divisions in UK society, regional, divisions by age and level of 
education. Brexit is primarily a consequence of neoliberalisation of British society and 
the rising social inequalities it has caused, of immigration to the UK, and of the false 
promises made by the Leave campaigners. It has brought significant negative effects to 
the UK economy, and jeopardized the position of the UK citizens working and living in 
EU countries, and vice versa. The long-term effects will be more negative for the UK 
than for the post-Brexit EU27. 
																																																								
11 https://www.odi.org/publications/10480-brexit-and-development-how-will-developing-countries-be-affected 
(accessed May 20, 2017). 
12 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-latest-news-signs-uk-economy-hurt-leave-eu-
inflation-pound-sterling-jobs-lending-bank-of-a7767526.html (accessed May 20, 2017). 
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